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ome ps~chological
asEects of the trial
juage's decision-making
The following article is an edited, abridged version of a piece
that originally appeared in
Mercer Law Review: 39.3

Spring, 1988, pp. 937-960.
Reprinted by permission.

In

1930 judge
Jerome Frank published his
remarkable book Law and the
Modern Mind. Frank stated
that there is a central myth
in law that focuses on our
eternal quest for certainty. He
linked this with a universal
fantasy of childhood wherein
infants attribute omniscience
and omnipotence to their parents and expect them to know
and to do everything. Much
of law-making, Frank believed, is a derivative of this
childhood need: all humans
have great reluctance to accept the fact that life is filled
with uncertainty.
This paper will extend
Frank's exploration into some
of the psychological means
that judges use in their
efforts to achieve this myth of
certainty and to make themselves comfortable while
doing so.
Clearly, trial judges occupy one of the more stressful
jobs in contemporary society.
Placed in their positions
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by election or appointment, they have a multitude of
role-defined tasks that they are expected to carry out
with impeccable honesty, resolute evenhandedness,
compassion, and a high degree of judicial wisdom. An
analysis of the psychological dynamics of judicial roles
reveals many elements which contribute greatly to the
emotional stress we so often see and hear about in
judges. In this paper I will explore some of these forces
and then present some suggestions about how they
might be mitigated by personal insight and perhaps
through judicial training. Also, if these psychological
dynamics can be understood better by counsel appearing as advocates, it may help them present their cases
in ways that will help ease the judge's tensions. Such a
process is an important aspect of the art of persuasion,
the sine qua non of good advocacy.
Let us begin by looking at the psychological characteristics of those who occupy the role of judge. Since
I first began observing law students and lawyers more
than 30 years ago, I noted that a large proportion of
those who enter the legal profession are characterized
by greater than average concerns about aggressiveness,
orderliness, and social altruism. I have also noticed how
these psychological motivations fare when law students
encounter the Socratic case method of legal education.
It is my impression that the law school educational encounter generally makes lawyers considerably less at
ease with their emotions than many non-lawyers.
Consequently, lawyers are inclined to intellectualize excessively in order to ward off uncomfortable feelings by
driving them out of consciousness. Lawyers may then
function in ways that make them quite oblivious to
some or many of the emotional aspects of their clients'
cases and their analysis may entirely miss vital psychological concerns of the client.
Lawyers carry these same attributes onto the bench
as judges. Many of the psychological dynamics described below are the products of these conditioned
inclinations when they impact upon some of the conflict
situations judges encounter in their daily work.

a

the Nature
and Recognition of Stress
All animal existence is characterized by the constant
existence of stress stimulated by a multitude of sources
('stressors'). No species is more prone to this phenomenon than Homo sapiens. We not only are bombarded by a
multitude of threats and pressures from without, but
because of our complex mental life, we also have to deal
with an unending stream of potentially stressful images from within. It is a fundamental biological law that
all animal organisms undergoing stress will respond

with a reaction of either fight or flight. This principle,
called Cannon's law, may occur in a number of ways.
The flow of adrenalin, triggered by the perception
of threat that causes fear or anxiety, stimulates a whole
train of physiological events, all of which facilitate
the fight/flight reaction. Additionally, a person can
psychologically fight or take flight through the use of
'defense mechanisms.' For example, when judges have
a troubling opinion to write, they may "forget" about it
and leave it undone. The long-range cost of this temporary relief is high: as more and more time passes, the
opinion usually becomes increasingly difficult to write.
The function of these defense maneuvers, then, is to
alleviate the awareness of stress and to restore a feeling
of balance, or homeostasis. Many of the seemingly
incomprehensible behaviors we observe in others, including judges, have this purpose. As we ponder some
of the specific conflicts that judges encounter, their
judicial behavior will become more understandable
when we analyze it against this model.

S

ome Stressors of Judging

Inevitably, given their backgrounds, those appointed
to the bench will have many deeply held values, some
of which must be set aside in deference to the obligation and the desire to be and to appear fair. This can
generate great internal conflict and stress. Most lawtrained people will probably agree that their legal
education provided little or no exploration of how to
cope with these elusive value conflicts.
As noted above, one of the powerful psychological
motivating forces for those who go into law is the desire
to be altruistic; judges are no exception. They must
grapple constantly, however, to resolve inordinately
complex issues in which it is difficult or impossible to
achieve a positive result. For example, juvenile court
judges must face families who suffer from enormous
social and economic deprivation. Because the chance of
successfully resolving these problems is miniscule, it is
easy for judges to develop a sense of virtual impotence
in their efforts to bring forth effective change for those
families.
The New York City Magistrate Court provides a
vivid example of massive overload and its consequent
stresses. Hundreds of cases pour onto the dockets of
these judges weekly and they must make a decision
about the disposition of each one. To observe them at
work is to see the progressive and insidious unfolding
of a great sense of cynicism and bitterness. It is easy to
understand their frustration and pain, as evidenced by
their frequent outbursts of angry sarcasm. For the most
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part, these judges work in an atmosphere of isolation,
so they do not have adequate opportunities to deal
with the emotional conflicts generated.

E sonal

"Biases" As Conflicts In Judicial
Function
During childhood, all humans acquire heavily biased
attitudes regarding fundamental values of "good and
bad" which they are taught by those who rear them.
As children grow up and become socialized, they reach
out progressively into settings beyond the home, and
many of their early prejudices are elaborately woven, in
varying degrees, into attitudes about racism, sexism,
religion, and politics.
Judicial appointments at the federal level, at least, are
slanted to a considerable degree by political and socioeconomic considerations. Consequently, there will be
many archaic biases derived from the particular childhood backgrounds of those appointed that will be
highly operative in their decisional behavior.
Elected judges on the other hand, must at least pay
lip service to being aware of public attitudes about how
they carry out their judicial role. While there may be
some reality to their notions about "what the public
thinks," more often than not, I believe, judges project
their own personal biases upon the community and
then act on them accordingly. At any rate, judges will
~!ways be torn between images of how they think a
Judge should behave versus how they are inclined to
decide based on old values retained.

L

Need To Decide

One of the most frequently harrowing psychological
tasks for a trial judge comes from the necessity to make
d~cisions. The opening of the trial presents the judge
with a deluge of problems involving law, evidence, and
procedure. With each of these problems, the judge
must deal with his or her own internal critic, who is
constantly evaluating the appropriateness and wisdom
of the decision. At the same time, this critic will be
receiving pressure from the lawyers on both sides of the
case who are eager to help the judge make the "right"
decision. How the judge perceives their arguments and
measures them against his own value presumptions
38

will influence not only what he decides, but how he
feels about his decision.
As Ju?ge Frank noted, the central unstated goal of
the law 1s related to mankind's unceasing search for certainty. In our society, the judge, who has the duty to
see that "the law" is found and followed, exemplifies
and personifies that goal. Society looks to the judge
with that expectation and need. Judges may well seek
to convince themselves that they have those oracular
powers which would enable them to find certainty,
in order to alleviate their own doubts.
When the trial is over and the judge has to state or
write the opinion, he or she may worry about several
matters: whether it was handed down too quickly or
too slowly; whether it is adequately reasoned; whether
it is wise or foolish . All of these concerns can raise anxiety. Some judges appear most reticent to hand down
opinions. They purportedly "work" on opinions for
months as though the passage of time makes it easier to
deal with the conflicted issues. This strategy only increases the likelihood that matters will become more
vague and necessitate unconscious "reconstructions" of
information before a judgment is reached.
In the great majority of cases the facts and the law are
more or less congruent and they may be decided without undue tension. However, when the facts or the law
in a case drive the judge toward a conclusion which
he feels will not be equitable, he may experience acute
psychological stress. He will need to realign the facts
somehow, or do some creative reshaping of the law to
resolve his desire to reach a just decision. He may do so
consciously or unconsciously, depending on how comfo~able he is with the notion of judge as lawmaker. If
he 1s uncomfortable with that role, he will indulge in
complicated rationalizations to make it appear that he
is only applying an old rule. The way in which such
judicial anxieties are resolved is a significant factor in
the development of the law. Sir Roger Ormrod of the
English Court of Appeals aptly states this proposition
when he says:
Most judges use [the law] as a sculptor uses
an armature, to promote a supporting structure for their judgments. Some proceed by
logical deductions; some, as I find I have to
do to understand it, look at it in an historical
perspective, as a process of evolutionary
development which occasionally appears
~o have gone off the track; others with greater
mtellectual power, succeed in extracting
principles from it; a few others find it an irksome yoke. If my thesis is right, all use it as
a means of resolving their judical anxieties.
During the process of writing the decision, the judge
must choose what he or she will include. Usually
judges are aware that the more they set forth, the more
fully revealed thier judicial reasoning will be. Value
judgments and biases will be more readily ascertainable
and thus will provide more grist for the appellate mill.
The desire not to be reversed will influence greatly the

judge's writing process. While appeals offer the possibility of personal psychological ratification, they also
carry the risk of revealing "reversible error." In order to
be comfortable with themselves, judges should understand this process and instead of seeing it purely as
jeopardy, should also use it to learn more about themselves. Frank believes the law would benefit if judges
were to express their values and preferences more
openly instead of couching them in the usual rationalizations which obfuscate comprehension and
interpretation.
There is yet another high principled aspiration for
a judge to strive. There may also be a resurgence of
omnipotence fantasies which psychiatrists and psychologists believe all individuals have during infancy. The
ongoing press of daily events make him aware of his
human fallibility and allow him to take a more humble
approach toward his tasks. Decisions may then be
tailored out of his best understanding of the case,
coupled with all of his and counsels' research and consideration. His opinion will then represent the best job
possible under the circumstances, and around that, his
own self-evaluation can be shaped realistically.

S tress

interferes with counsel's tactical plan for the examination, and may cause the counsel authority problems
before the jury.
A judge's comments upon and evaluation of the evidence to the jury can have a powerful influence on the
jury. The option to make such evaluative observations
would certainly be tempting to a judge with power
inclinations, and his concurrent need to balance this
temptation or action with images of even-handedness
would stir conflicts in him.
Of course the judge has another great potential
source of power deployment in his relationships to
counsel during the trial. Since most judges come from
the trial bar, they are (or can imagine themselves to be)
good litigators. To whatever degree their narcissism
permits, they may tilt with counsel merely to show
their own litigation prowess.
Finally, in writing his decision, the judge can take a
fairly wide range of positions in order to give himself a
sense of powerfulness. Although he must avoid statements of law that would bring reversal on appeal, he
still has great latitude in asserting his opinion in the service of power images. However, there is always an inner
part of his psyche that knows the appropriate uses of
his authority and that will prod him to conform more or
less with "the law." In the end, if a judge is to gain gratification from his role, it needs to come from his own
knowledge of a job well-performed, and not from his
desire to be powerful.

From

Problems With Power

Trial judges sit in a position of enormous power over
those who appear before them. Although there are procedural rules to define and limit their actions and codes
of judicial ethics to modulate their behavior, ultimately
judges have discretion to deploy their power in a wide
variety of ways. In addition to the external influences
upon them (rules, etc.), they will need to accommodate
certain internal attitudes they hold about issues of
power. Many people, including judges, have been
acculturated to feel that any assertive action toward
others is to be questioned. As a result, any impulse to
be aggressive may cause the opposite response of submissiveness (i.e. the defense of reaction-formation).
Other judges, angered by any one of a variety
of lawyer activities before them, may respond
with inappropriate outbursts which seem to be
out of control. These outbursts may reflect a repression or a denial of the restraint a judge is supposed
to use in the performance of his or her tasks.
The fact finding process presents the greatest likelihood that a judge's conflicting feelings about his
power will work to the detriment of the judicial process.
Judges may actively-communicate their opinions to the
jury through vocal inflections or body language. This
interferes with the jury's role as fact finder. Other examples include questioning or calling witnesses. This

S tress

From

Sentencing Tensions

Criminal court judges widely acknowledge that sentencing is one of their most difficult and stressful tasks.
They must face (or avoid facing) and determine the disposition of the individual who has just been found
"criminal." The sentencing judge's psychological and
emotional tendency toward retribution often will oppose his own wishes to understand, to forgive, and to
move toward rehabilitation. To solve this conflict he can
easily move toward complicated rationalizations about
deterrence. A judge may blur the distinction between
his own values about sentencing and those he attributes (i.e. projects) to the public. Such "reasoning" can
be further rationalized with concerns about reelection
or appointment to a higher court. These conflicts may
create sufficient stress to require the judge to resort to
his own specific psychological defense maneuvers.
Even after deciding how he would like to dispose of a
case, the judge swiftly encounters the disturbing facts
of reality which grossly limit his alternatives. The inability to put into effect the treatment plan he believes
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appropriate may create an enormous sense of frustration that elicits feelings of inadequacy or even guilt,
making the whole task seem unconscionably impossible. Such thinking is very painful for conscientious
humans: it always entails deliberately "writing off"
certain individuals in cases where treatment payoff is so
low that it is not cost effective and would seriously
jeopardize the whole treatment system.

.
C
onflicts Over
Personal Needs Versus Professional
Demands
'C
:J•

Another source of stress for a judge is the excessive
amount of work to do. If a judge is conscientious, he is
aware of the fact that he is tempted to give less attention
i ~~ issues than they deserve. Sometimes this will cause
'"fllm to press for compromise settlements in cases where
considerations of justice suggest that there should be
no compromise. Such work pressure can produce dissatisfaction, defensive cynicism, and/or a great sense
of inadequacy.
All of the above conflict situations function as psychological stressors that can stimulate great internal
discomfort for judges and disturb the sense of certainty
which, as noted earlier, is so important. Because so
much of such a problem is felt to be inside the judge's
mind, he has little direct means for dealing with the
resultant anxiety. The fight/flight reaction of Cannon's
Law will take effect and from that point, behavior and
decision making is very likely to be nonrational.

l

udicial Self
Help and Aids for Advoeates
The principal remedy for the judge's problems of
psychological tension is for him to be able to resolve
the conflicts which produced the tension. Naturally, a
large and comparatively well known part of his judicial
efficiency depends upon his possessing a thorough
substantive knowledge of law and procedure. He may
also have a good grasp of relevant jurisprudential
knowledge enabling him to explore a broader rationale
for the decisions he makes. The judge, through that
knowledge, will realize that others have struggled with
similar questions and agonized over incomplete and
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unsatisfying answers, just as he has done. The distress
arising from a sense of isolation in the struggle will be
alleviated to some degree. The judge can then feel that
he properly applied the law and any negative impact
his opinion had on any given litigant will not be
his "fault."
There is no group of professionals for whom the
ancient Greek admonition of "know thyself" has more
applicability and importance than for the judiciary. At
the very least judges should work conscientiously to become intuitively and cognitively sensitive to the kinds
of issues that cause them emotional conflict. Only then
can they face the multitude of contradictory values encountered in judicial deliberations and be able to keep
them within reach of cognition and rational resolution.

c

onclusion

Judges must nurture self-awareness as a matter of
professional responsibility and as a duty they owe to
their role. I know that there is little or nothing we can
do to eliminate the all too human proclivities which
influence judges' decision making. If a judge is conscientious, however, and wishes to do so, he may learn
about his psychological self and optimize his chances
for dealing responsibly with all of his personal quirks,
biases, and inclinations. Such self-awareness will also
help the judge to be more comfortable and better gratified as judicial tasks and efforts are carried out amidst
the constant strum und drang of judging. He and we
would all profit from such efforts.
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